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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND THIRTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday 28 January 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim (Brazil)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 639th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, His Excellency Amre Moussa, who is inscribed to address the Conference today. The Minister has had a brilliant diplomatic career and has great experience in multilateral affairs. He has served three times with the United Nations in New York, in the third instance as Permanent Representative, and has twice been Director of the Department of International Organizations in the Foreign Ministry. He has participated in many international conferences and, in particular, in special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I am sure that the Minister's statement will be followed by all of us with great interest.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Egypt and India. I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, His Excellency Amre Moussa.

Mr. MOUSSA (Egypt): Thank you, Mr. President, for the kind and generous words of welcome that you have extended to me. I am pleased to have the opportunity to share my thoughts with this august body as it starts its annual session in the wake of the conclusion of several historic agreements such as START II and the chemical weapons Convention. And I find it highly appropriate that the Conference is chaired at this time by a representative of Brazil, a country that has played an active and highly constructive role in the field of disarmament in nuclear as well as in the other domains, in both global and regional contexts of disarmament. I would also like to seize this occasion to express my appreciation to Ambassador Berasategui, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, for his untiring efforts at the CD and his contribution to its work.

As you are well aware, the last few years have been tumultuous times of change. Bipolarism and its antecedents have literally crumbled before our eyes, and we live today in extremely fluid political circumstances, which truly test the wisdom and compassion of world leaders. Are they to succeed in harnessing the exuberant quest for change, freedom, and national expression with all its vibrant passions and emotions, in order to establish a better, more humane world, where equal rights and the rule of law reign supreme? Or will they become once again party to the reorganization of the world order on the basis of strength and weakness and the same archaic attitudes of bipolarism, which consider diversity as a source of concern and perturbation to be confronted, rather than a wealth of rich resources upon which to establish a truly global community of nations?

The true test of time is whether we will be able to raise our national, regional and global political rationale to levels commensurate with the challenges of the present and the hopes for the future, rather than attempt to tailor these challenges to fit the global body politic we established in the past. In these challenging times, where concepts and delineations have to be reviewed, most relevant to the work of your Conference is how we define the concept of security. Traditionally this has been defined in military terms alone. However, over the years, the political dimension of security, with its

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social, economic and environmental pillars, has gradually gained ground, and the term now, for many, including Egypt, has a multi-dimensional definition which, in its wider context, often extends beyond the mere protection of national geographical boundaries.

Realizing these new dimensions of security, Egypt has been instrumental in initiating discussions on this issue in several different regional and extraregional contexts. In the Arab League on Arab security; within the Organization of African Unity on African security; within the Middle East peace talks on regional security; as well as calling for the establishment of a Mediterranean forum for dialogue amongst countries on both shores of those warm waters. Admittedly, the military dimension remains prominent and overarmament remains prevalent throughout the world. This is a challenge that we in the international community, and you as a conference on disarmament in particular, must address seriously.

I would like to seize this opportunity to call for the elaboration of a new approach to international security - one based on a new definition that rises to the challenges of our times. Security found in "common interests", rather than "expressions of military force or checks and balances". In so doing, two fundamental parameters should remain at the forefront of our concerns. Firstly, security should be achieved at lower levels of armament. In our changing world, with security more and more being defined in non-military terms, the present levels of armament are neither politically nor morally justifiable. Secondly, States should have equal obligations and make equal commitments in the field of disarmament. Where disarmament agreements are possible, they should entail equal rights and responsibilities. International relations should now provide an equitable launching pad for new horizons and cooperation in the field of security. This is particularly true in the regional context, where inequality breeds suspicion and sows the seeds of conflict.

These objectives, with the concepts and principles they are based upon, provide the guiding light for the positions that my country has traditionally adopted in the realm of disarmament, and for the formulation of the immediate objectives that she pursues, both on a global as well as regional level. In this vein, we have consistently striven for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear, chemical, or biological. For example, in 1968, Egypt was amongst the original signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, because of her unwavering commitment to the elimination of these weapons, and our fervent hope that by taking this high road other States, in and beyond our region, but especially in our region, would be encouraged to do the same.

Six years later, frustrated by the lack of response, Egypt, together with Iran, co-sponsored a proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Another seven years passed without retribution. Yet true to our conviction, in 1981 we again took the high road and ratified the NPT. It is also pertinent to point out that Arab countries have either ratified the NPT or

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entered into full safeguard agreements with IAEA. Regrettably the result was the same.

We then decided to try a different approach, and actively engage the international community, as well as our regional partners, Israel in particular, in a comprehensive approach for dealing with weapons of mass destruction. The objective was to take into account issues that had gained increasing concern, such as chemical weapon disarmament. In April of 1990 President Mubarak proposed that all weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, be eliminated from the Middle East. This proposal was embraced by the Arab world. We were all thus committing ourselves to eliminating all these weapons, including chemical weapons, even before you here at the CD had concluded your work on the convention prohibiting chemical weapons.

This proposal has gradually gained wide-ranging support, with more extraregional parties endorsing it. I would like to emphasize in this regard that our commitment to its objectives are only surpassed by our determination to safeguard our own security interests, and indeed those of the Arab world and the Middle East as a whole, security interests that can only be truly ensured if based on effective, verifiable, reciprocal arrangements.

Recently, at the ceremony in Paris opening the CWC for signature, Foreign Minister Peres of Israel briefly touched upon elements that related to our proposal of April 1990. I do not intend to discuss these elements here, whether those that we are inclined to support, such as comprehensiveness of approach, or those which we may interpret differently, such as conditionality. I would however like to welcome Israel's first indication of readiness to be engaged on weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Yet I feel compelled at the same time to urge Israel to make full use of the potential for concrete progress that exists at present, rather than postpone and condition freeing the Middle East from the dangers of weapons of mass destruction until after peace has been achieved in the region.

Egypt on her part, intends to intensify here contacts in this regard with all her regional partners, including Israel, both bilaterally, as well as multilaterally within the context of the Middle East arms control talks. Hopefully, in the near future we will be able to reach conclusions which will find tangible expression by all sides in the nuclear as well as chemical fields.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons comes up for extension in 1995. While it is not directly before you for consideration, many of its elements are dealt with here in one form or the other. Nuclear disarmament is a prominent, albeit inactive item on your agenda. I find it perplexing that you are not more active in this regard, particularly at a time when significant global achievements have been made, most recently START II.

CTBT and security assurances are other such issues. It is our sincere hope that your Conference will generate agreements on these issues of paramount

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importance to nuclear non-proliferation. And, without prejudice to negotiations that may be occurring bilaterally, we do believe that the Conference on Disarmament can play a constructive role in limiting vertical and horizontal proliferation, and in adopting further, more comprehensive measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear States against the use of nuclear weapons. A new look by you all at the concept of positive and negative assurances is required and opportune, now that the counterbalancing complexities of the NATO-Warsaw security relationships are behind us.

Another question of great importance is how to ensure that NPT, or the non-proliferation regime which has the NPT as its cornerstone, truly acquires a universal character. NPT parties and non-parties alike must find ways and means to achieve the objective which they have all professed to aspire to, "... preventing the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons". The 1995 NPT conference provides us with the opportunity to come together and develop a new nuclear non-proliferation contract for the twenty-first century. A contract, with the NPT as its core, but encompassing associations with States that have remained beyond it while supporting its nuclear non-proliferation objectives. For example, closer association between NPT and regional arrangements could be a beneficial and auspicious beginning.

We have all witnessed some newly emerging trends in the field of disarmament during the last few years. Issues such as arms transfers and transparency have become increasingly topical in the global and regional disarmament debate. I must admit we have followed these trends with mixed feelings. On the one hand, we share the view that overarmament is rampant and must be addressed, thus do not object to the declared objectives of controlling arms transfers - quite the contrary, we endorse them. We also believe that greater transparency is imperative for successful disarmament negotiations, and are therefore enthusiastic about the emergence of this trend as well. On the other hand, I cannot but admit to being disappointed as to the piecemeal, tailor-made manner in which some of these issues are being dealt with. While the professed objective of regulating arms transfers is to prevent over-armament, and the proliferation of destabilizing weapons, this whole exercise has been limited to importing and exporting of conventional weapons. We wonder, do not domestic military industrial production capabilities provide for a significant, often major portion of the aggregate military arsenals? And would we not be exacerbating already unstable situations if, by limiting our endeavours to imports and exports, we provided an added advantage, quantitatively or qualitatively, to States with developed military industries? We have similar questions with regard to transparency. Why is it that weapons of mass destruction or their relevant technology are not covered by such measures? Cannot they be equally destabilizing? Are they not subject to disarmament negotiations? Are we not all interested in eliminating these weapons as well?

Of course, it can always be said that the measures suggested thus far constitute only a beginning to be built upon, and, that functionality and practicality compel us to start with a limited agenda. We understand these

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arguments and are not insensitive to them. However, we have strong convictions that to be fully effective, disarmament measures must be balanced and fair. They must not unduly hamper the peaceful uses of science and technology. And they should not divide the world into invidious categories of "haves" and "have-nots".

Finally, I wish to express our gratitude to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". The report make a number of interesting proposals and suggestions, which Egypt will address in detail through the appropriate channels. I would like to highlight however that we fully support the conclusion reached that "a globalization of the process of arms control and disarmament is now needed". We believe that your Conference in particular has an invaluable role to play in giving tangible expression to the thought, and hope to see an active role for your Conference in developing the disarmament agenda for the twenty-first century.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Amre Moussa, for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and especially those he addressed to my country. They testify to the excellent cooperation between Brazil and Egypt. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Satish Chandra.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): Mr. President, since this is the first occasion that I am taking the floor to speak substantively in this body, permit me at the outset to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I fully share the sentiments of all our colleagues here that under your guidance and leadership, 1993 will be a successful year for the CD. I would also like to thank all those who addressed warm words of welcome to me and spoke so kindly of my predecessor.

I have heard, with great attention, the thought-provoking statement of His Excellency Mr. Amre Moussa, the Foreign Minister of Egypt. For me personally, it was both a pleasure and a privilege to see him here, and to hear him speak with his customary precision and clarity, because he comes from a country close to us, and because I have had the honour of interacting with him a few years ago when he was representing his great country in New Delhi.

I would also like to avail of this opportunity to congratulate the Conference on Disarmament and all the dramatis personae involved who so painstakingly and skilfully hammered out the chemicals weapons Convention and made possible its recent signature at Paris. This Convention has garnered near-universal acclaim and rightly so as it is the first global, non-discriminatory and multilateral agreement that provides for the complete prohibition and elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. A remarkable and indeed distinguishing feature of the Convention is the stringent standard of verification which is much more far-reaching than in any other disarmament agreement so far concluded. This Convention

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fulfils India's long-standing desire to seek the complete elimination of chemical weapons through a regime which is universally applicable and non-discriminatory in character. It is our hope that once the Convention comes into effect, all existing discriminatory restrictions outside the scope of the treaty which are based either on unilateral actions or on export control regimes not consonant with the Convention will cease to exist amongst the States parties. India, on its part, is totally committed not to acquire or produce chemical weapons stemming from its unreserved commitment to the purposes and objectives of the chemical weapons Convention. Indeed, even prior to becoming a signatory, India had instituted a series of export restraints to ensure that dual-purpose chemicals are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

1992 has been an eventful year for disarmament because, apart from the successful negotiation of the chemical weapons Convention, we have seen the conclusion of START II between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. Both countries richly deserve our commendation for having reached this agreement as it will reduce by about two thirds the numbers of warheads on all delivery systems by the year 2003. START II thus, undoubtedly, makes an important contribution in furthering mutual confidence and consolidating the climate for peace. The conclusion of the negotiations leading to START II in so short a time-frame clearly demonstrates that even complex disarmament issues can be resolved with despatch given the necessary political will.

It is in this context that India proposed at SSOD-III an outline of an action plan for achieving our goal of a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order. The central focus of this action plan is the elimination of all nuclear weapons in three stages, recognizing the need for flexibility in staging some of the measures proposed. Among the nuclear disarmament measures envisaged in the plan are a ban on the production of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissionable material, a moratorium on testing of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test-ban treaty and negotiations on an international convention outlawing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It also envisages the eventual elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. This plan, tabled as CD/859 on 15 August 1988, is still eminently relevant.

Coming to the agenda of the CD, we are somewhat disappointed to note that it has been prevented from effectively discharging its responsibility on the items that have been accorded the highest priority, namely, the nuclear items. Thus, over the years, ad hoc committees have not been set up on agenda item 2 - Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament - and agenda item 3 - Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. In keeping with the action plan tabled by us and in keeping with the call by the tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Jakarta in September 1992, we feel that priority in negotiations should be given to agenda items 2 and 3 as well as the nuclear test ban, security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is, in our view, not desirable to set up ad hoc committees on other items to the exclusion of

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agenda items 2 and 3, which are amongst the most important, as it de-prioritizes them. The centrality of nuclear issues in the disarmament agenda must be maintained if we are to genuinely look to a non-violent and nuclear-weapon-free world.

As a country which has always been in the forefront in the cause of disarmament, India has naturally given serious thought and consideration to the report of the Secretary-General on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". We are in full accord with the view expressed by the Secretary-General that the international community must "aim for no less a goal than the complete elimination of nuclear weapons" and that "the full array of hazards posed to humanity by these weapons cannot be adequately dealt with until we have crossed the threshold of the post-nuclear-weapon age". It is our submission that this key objective must never be lost sight of as it is central to the theme of disarmament. We should not forget that, commendable as has been START II, even after the cuts envisaged under it have been undertaken, the nuclear-weapon States will still have awesome arsenals capable of destroying the world several times over and dividing the globe into "haves" and "have-nots". We must, therefore, seek to build on and beyond START II. It is our hope that START II will pave the way for commencement of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament involving not only the United States and the Russian Federation but all other nuclear-weapon States as well. This move must be inspired by the vision of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons for this is a sine qua non for the long-term establishment of international peace and security based on an equitable, stable, just and cooperative world order. In today's world, there is a compelling need for nuclear-weapon States to re-examine doctrines of nuclear deterrence which have been propounded by them in the past to justify maintenance and expansion of their respective nuclear arsenals.

While we recognize that the regional approach can supplement and help in global efforts in disarmament, it may be noted that the definition of a region must encompass the full range of security concerns of the countries involved as also the practicability of the specific measures of disarmament suggested in this context. Since nations perceive their security indivisibly, compartmentalizing security through artificially designated regions cannot work. Each region has to be clearly defined with the full consensus of the participating States. Agreements have to be arrived at freely among the States concerned, taking into account the characteristics of the region. Essential pre-requisites for any such arrangement are scrupulous adherence to the basic principles of international relations such as non-interference in internal affairs, non-incitement to terrorism, secessionism or subversion and appropriate confidence-building measures. Confidence, in turn, must be enhanced on all fronts and in tandem, if security is to be enhanced. Continuance of hostile acts and inflammatory statements diminish the value of political confidence-building measures.

Within the constraints and limitations cited above, India has sought to build confidence in its neighbourhood through transparency and dialogue. The range of CBMs entered into with neighbouring countries is impressive and covers

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three broad categories - political, communications and technical. The political CBMs include "declarations of intent", discussions on security-related concepts and doctrines, measures aimed at improving people-to-people contacts, and developing a broad base for bilateral relations; the communications CBMs include the provision of communication links such as hot lines, dedicated channel links, risk reduction or conflict prevention mechanisms and periodic meetings at official level to discuss issues and defuse tensions; technical CBMs include activities relating to arms limitation and transparency, i.e., prior notification, constraints on military activities in certain zones, ceilings on military equipment, etc.

Inevitably, the range and depth of these CBMs with each of our neighbours vary depending upon the relationship and the mutuality of interest. As a point of interest, it may be noted that at the first round of Foreign-Secretary-level talks with Pakistan in July 1990, India put forward an integrated package of CBMs. The package included CBMs in all the three categories - political, communication and technical. It provided for information-sharing on military exercises as a means of promoting transparency and reducing misapprehensions, improving communications among military commanders, joint border patrolling, exchanges of delegations of armed forces and at the political level, reiteration and reaffirmation of settling disputes through peaceful means and bilateral negotiations, ceasing hostile propaganda, respecting the Line of Control and refraining from acts detrimental to maintenance of peaceful harmonious relations and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

The six rounds of Foreign-Secretary-level talks held so far have focused on carrying forward the elements of the CBM package. At the sixth round of Foreign-Secretary-level talks held in August 1992, instruments of ratification were exchanged on agreements signed on advance notice of military exercises, manoeuvres and troop movements, prevention of airspace violation and permitting overflights and landings of military aircraft. Also, at the sixth round of Foreign-Secretary-level talks, in anticipation of the multilateral, global convention on chemical weapons, India and Pakistan signed an agreement to ban the development, production and use of chemical weapons.

In the nuclear field, an agreement between India and Pakistan on the prohibition of attacks on each other's nuclear facilities was signed in December 1988. I am happy to be able to state that lists of these nuclear facilities were exchanged under this agreement for the second consecutive year on 4 January 1993. Communications between the two countries have also improved as the Directors-General of Military Operations of both countries remain in telephonic contact over the hot line on a weekly basis following the agreement at the third round of Foreign-Secretary-level talks in December 1990. As a step towards transparency, a formal invitation in August 1992 was extended to the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan to visit India. While CBMs are not a substitute for disarmament, India is fully sensitive to the contribution of CBMs in reducing the risk of misperceptions and enhancing predictability in the conduct of inter-State relations.

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In the nuclear field, the real issue today is not the NPT or its extension as suggested in the Secretary-General's report. The real issue is how to put an end to proliferation and to eliminate nuclear weapons. Accordingly, there is a need for an international dialogue to review the NPT to plug existing loopholes and to make it an instrument for achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Extending the NPT, which is discriminatory and imperfect to begin with, and which has proved demonstrably ineffective in preventing proliferation either of nuclear weapons or of nuclear-weapon States, is not the way to achieve non-proliferation. While India shares the concerns with regard to proliferation, we do not believe that partial and unjust measures or punitive action on a selective basis will achieve the desired result. Just as chemical and biological weapons are matters of global concern to be dealt with globally, nuclear weapons and the nuclear threat cannot be addressed without a global approach. A new international understanding and consensus on what constitutes non-proliferation is urgently required so that the pursuit of a global approach to non-proliferation which is universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory is seriously attempted. If the international community is capable of achieving a convention to ban chemical weapons, there is no reason to believe that, given the political will, it will not achieve a similar convention to ban nuclear weapons. In this respect the CWC reflects the model of a future global disarmament agreement in the nuclear field in both its multilateral negotiating format as well as its universal and non-discriminatory approach.

While the CD has finally been able to complete negotiations on a global, non-discriminatory CWC, the recommendations regarding priorities in the field of disarmament endorsed by the international community at SSOD-I have never been translated into universally accepted norms, principles and processes to deal with the dangers and to eliminate the threat comprehensively. The adoption of an "arms control" approach, as distinct and different from a "disarmament" framework, has failed to arrest proliferation and is unlikely to provide a viable paradigm for the future. The Secretary-General has expressed the hope that "over the longer term, ... we may achieve more equitable and comprehensive approaches to responsible proliferation control, not only of weapons but also of long-range delivery systems and dual-use technologies". He has also expressed the view that "to be fully effective, such controls must be balanced and fair; they must not unduly hamper the peaceful uses of science and technology; and they should not divide the world into the invidious categories of 'haves' and 'have-nots'". While we fully endorse this view, we feel that this is a goal which should be achieved in the shortest time-frame possible. Closed-door "clubs", "groups" and regimes created to impose unilateral restrictions on trade in technology, equipment and material on a discriminatory basis will not prevent proliferation. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction cannot be achieved by proposals aimed only at arms reduction, though they are welcome. Nor can initiatives which in reality only preserve the monopoly of a few States over weapons of mass destruction, missile technology and export markets for conventional weapons contribute to prevention of proliferation.

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The views of the Secretary-General on arms transfers are noteworthy. The arms build-up, spiralled by the increased military expenditure of the big military spenders and exporters of armaments, affects developing countries doubly - in the first place, the proliferating expenditure on armaments reduces the resources available for economic development and growth, and secondly, it fuels further competitive expenditure on account of perceived defence requirements for the security needs of the developing countries. India has all along advocated that steps should be taken to curb this tendency and trend. Unfortunately, without self-restraint on the part of the big industrialized arms suppliers and curtailment of financial assistance for purchase of weapons, this may just be a pipedream. We are impressed that everybody wants transparency in arms transfers but we are concerned that transparency is becoming an end in itself. In our view, transparency will serve no purpose if it does not achieve the objective of reduction in massive arms transfers. Transparency must be reflected in defence expenditure in per capita terms and as a proportion of GDP. It will necessarily have to be ensured that arms freed as a result of disarmament measures in one region are not diverted to other countries or organizations. An important dimension of transparency in armaments is the illicit arms trade which is most dangerous because of its destabilizing and destructive effects through the fuelling of phenomena like State-sponsored terrorism directed against other countries, subversion and drug trafficking.

We agree with the views of the Secretary-General on the practical importance of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. This is a global CBM. To succeed, it must however be non-discriminatory and attract universal adherence with a high degree of simultaneity.

The present disarmament machinery, we feel, is adequate to deal with the tasks at hand. The difficulty in making progress on some of the priority areas of disarmament has little to do with the present machinery. The three multilateral disarmament bodies, namely, the CD, the DC and the United Nations General Assembly, have distinct yet complementary interrelated functions. The central issue is how best to rationalize the work of these three bodies to ensure that each singly and the three in combination contribute as effectively as possible to the promotion of global cooperative security. In this context, I think we could do no better than go by the UNDC 1990 consensus report on the "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament". The CD, as set out in the report, has a unique character and importance as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body and it is important that it continues to discharge its substantive responsibility. In this context, we do not think that it would be appropriate for the Conference to take on the role of the "permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms regulations and disarmament agreements", as suggested in the Secretary-General's report. This would divert its attention from its prime task as a negotiating body. In a similar vein, before considering the idea of greater Security Council involvement in disarmament matters, we should ensure that the decisions emanating from it reflect consensus of the United Nations membership. It is for this reason that priority must be given to democratization of the United Nations

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Security Council and other United Nations organs. The Security Council must enjoy the confidence of the entire United Nations membership for only then will its actions carry credibility.

My delegation does not share apprehensions about the diminishing role of the Conference on Disarmament after the chemical weapons Convention. There are a number of items on the agenda of the CD which are as important as the CWC and the CD will contribute greatly to the disarmament process by taking them up for negotiations. There is no lack of agenda items to be negotiated. The danger lies in the lack of political will, fear of transparency and deliberate downgrading of the multilateral process in priority areas of disarmament. The CD should be allowed to fulfil its role as a negotiating forum and concentrate on concrete negotiation on its agenda items 1 to 3 concerning nuclear disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Chandra for this statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. I ask now if there is any other representative who wishes to take the floor at this stage. If that's not the case, I have to convey to you my feeling that we have made important progress in the consultations concerning the setting up of our machinery for work, but I also understand that a short recess might be useful at this stage to finalize some aspects of these consultations and to confirm some information that I received very informally only some minutes ago. So, if you agree, I will suspend this meeting for about 10 minutes and we will resume immediately after that. I will act accordingly.

The meeting was suspended at 10.55 a.m. and resumed at 11.15 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 639th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

Consultations have been proceeding on the question of the chairmanships of the ad hoc committees which were set up last week. As a result of these consultations, I can invite you to take action on the appointment of the chairmen of two ad hoc committees, namely, Nuclear test ban and Prevention of an arms race in outer space. I propose that we take up first the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and appoint as Chairman Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: We shall now turn to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. May I propose the appointment of Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As regards the chairmanships of the ad hoc committees on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against

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the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and on transparency in armaments, we will take them up at our next plenary meeting.

On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I extend to the just appointed chairmen of the ad hoc committees our congratulations on their appointment. We wish them every success in discharging the delicate responsibilities entrusted to them.

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will recall that on previous occasions, I announced my intention to appoint two special coordinators to conduct consultations on the issues of membership and the agenda. Accordingly, I have decided to appoint, as special Coordinator for the issue of membership, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, and for the question of the agenda, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico. I am grateful to them for having kindly accepted their appointment, and I wish them success in their consultations. As I also stated, their contribution to the Conference's work will be particularly important in the preparation of the report to be transmitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly on those subjects with which they are now entrusted.

At the presidential consultation yesterday we agreed, at the request of Ambassador Batsanov, to hold an additional plenary meeting on

Tuesday, 2 February, at 10 a.m., to listen to the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. I trust that the Conference accepts this proposal.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: It is understood, of course, that any other member or non-member invited to participate in our work wishing to address the plenary on that day may do so.

That concludes our work for today, and I shall now proceed to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 2 February, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.